Introduction 1
from rolling back the frontiers of the state to unleash the entrepreneurial zeal of the 'developmental market', the Cameron-Clegg government has consolidated the status of the Treasury as the pilot agency of the British developmental state. In an age of supposed austerity, and following the example of £1.162 trillion bank bailout, taxpayers' money has been used to ensure an income to rent-seeking private corporate interests through the provision of lucrative opportunities, not in competitive markets, but in state guaranteed or subsidised projects. 8 
6
This article seeks to account for the United Kingdom government's response to the financial crisis, and how a massive failure of private financial markets has been transformed into a fiscal crisis for the British state necessitating sustained austerity over two terms of government. Since May 1979, successive United Kingdom governments have claimed to be restoring an entrepreneur-led enterprise culture, based upon a 'developmental market' political rhetoric and agenda which has asserted the political, economic and moral superiority of the Anglosphere civilization and Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. However, this article argues that United Kingdom governments from the Thatcher governments of the 1980s to those led by David Cameron since May 2010 have in fact reflected a longstanding developmental state tradition which can be traced back to England's financial revolution during the seventeenth century. Where late industrializing economies in Asia have pursued a developmental state strategy based upon the nurturing of competitive advantage in civilian manufacturing industries, England and latterly the United Kingdom has pursued a developmental state strategy founded upon competitive advantage in financial markets and military industries. It is only when this alternative historical narrative is fully acknowledged that the United Kingdom government response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis can be understood.
The Developmental State Tradition in England 7
In its Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of The South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has contended that in societies which have brought about transformational human development, a common feature has been "a strong, proactive state-also referred to as a 'developmental state'", i.e. "a state with an activist government and often an apolitical elite that sees rapid economic development as their primary aim", and capable of setting policy priorities for and nurturing the development of selected industries. 9 Ever since Chalmers Johnson first coined the term 'developmental state' in his groundbreaking study of industrial policy in Japan, 10 it has been assumed that developmental states have been the province of late industrializing economies, such as Japan and South Korea. Johnson specified how a developmental state, orchestrated by a pilot agency such as the Japanese Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI), could engineer "market-conforming" patterns of state intervention in selected strategic industries.
8
Whether it is through the lens of different varieties of capitalism; 11 models of capitalism; 12 cultures of capitalism; 13 national systems of innovation; 14 or developmental states, 15 as the world's earliest industrializing nation, England as a distinctive national political economy in its own right has tended not to feature in any discussion of national economic performance. In the vast literature on British decline in general and the relative economic decline of the United Kingdom in particular, the timing of England's industrialization has been widely held to be a significant competitive disadvantage in terms of her later capacity to develop the appropriate institutional foundation for industrial modernization. In short, economic growth and development in the United Kingdom has been held to have been frustrated by the absence of an industrial policy, developmental state, national system of innovation or technocratic modernization strategy. 16 
9
What this literature has overlooked is that, more than a century before it underwent the world's first industrial revolution, England underwent a series of other revolutions, including major commercial and financial revolutions symbolized by the establishment of the East India and Virginia Company of London in the early years of the seventeenth century and the Bank of England in 1694. Because of the intervening political, administrative, fiscal, scientific and military revolutions which England experienced during the seventeenth century, and the pattern of state intervention that had developed in earlier centuries, the English state had actually become a developmental state long before the era of industrialization. 17 But it had done so by nurturing the development of the military industries of the warfare state, notably the Royal Navy. 18 At the same time, "the development of a market in securities in London in the period 1688 to 1756 was one of the most important aspects of the financial revolution", which saw the developmental state strategically nurturing financial industries. 19 The English Financial Revolution during the period between 1620 and 1920 has also been extensively documented by Carl Wennerlind. He has noted how:
Comprised of a long-term funded national debt, an active securities market, and a widely circulating credit currency, the modern financial system enabled England to create a powerful fiscal-military state, to forge a dominant global empire, and to move in the direction of the Industrial Revolution faster than any other nation. 20 12 Consequently, England should instead be recognized as the location of the world's first developmental state, but one which developed financial services and military industries, rather than the civilian manufacturing industries nurtured by subsequent developmental states elsewhere. As Sophus Reinert has noted, "England was among the most interventionist states of its age", 22 where "political economy was not merely the science of reforming institutions and making the kingdom wealthy, it rendered nations viable as political entities in the midst of international rivalries. 23 13 English liberalism "was not antagonistic to the state. The liberalism spawned in 1688-89 was revolutionary and interventionist rather than moderate and antistatist". 24 That pattern of revolutionary liberalism and state intervention has continued to the modern era, and accounts for the willingness of the British state to continue to this day to intervene strategically in defence of financial markets and military industries. Indeed, many key events of the past forty-five years of British politics can be understood as a 14 It is this particular model of national development which can help to explain the state of the contemporary economy and the economic policy choices of United Kingdom governments in response to the crisis of 2008. As Darion Acemoglu and James Robinson have noted "England was unique among nations when it made the breakthrough to sustained economic growth in the seventeenth century". 25 It was not entrepreneurship, the institutions of the developmental market, or the manifest destiny of the English as an exceptional, chosen people, on account of their longstanding attachment to liberalism, free trade and parliamentary democracy, which brought about England's rise from relative obscurity at the end of the sixteenth century to a nascent global power at the end of the seventeenth century. On the contrary, this great transformation was led by the interventions of the centralized English state.
The Developmental Market from Thatcher to Cameron 15 Why has the role of the developmental state not been acknowledged in the British state's reaction to the crisis of 2008? To a significant degree, this omission reflects the degree to which modern British politics has become stranded on the ideological common ground of the political economy of neo-liberalism, which has itself been founded upon an alternative political narrative and very particular understanding of the history of England and the United Kingdom. In parallel to Chalmers Johnson's notion of the 'developmental state', I have coined the term 'developmental market' to denote the policy agenda of market liberalization, deregulation and privatization fashioned by neoliberalism during the past forty years. Proponents of the developmental market from Margaret Thatcher to David Cameron and George Osborne have portrayed England as having risen to greatness through laissez-faire, limited government, and free trade. 16 This ideological and political triumph for the neo-liberal Right in British politics has been illustrated by its attitude towards the 15 June 2015 eight hundredth anniversary of the signing of the Magna Carta. This event was mobilized by the Right as part of a broader political narrative to demonstrate the political, economic and moral superiority of the Anglo-Saxon 'free market' model of capitalism over those of its continental European and 26 The common law of England, the rule of law, personal liberty, representative government, its uncodified, in a single document, constitution, and the English-speaking peoples of the 'Anglosphere' should be understood as the inventors of freedom and the prime movers of "a common Western civilization". At the heart of this narrative is "a continuous 'Anglo-Saxon' civilization, whose chief characteristic is a commitment to free markets". 27 The greatest threat to this civilization is now posed by the European Union and its alleged ambitions for a European 'superstate, or what Hannan terms "Continentalization". 28 17 For his part, David Cameron has identified Magna Carta's anniversary as an historical weapon to be mobilized for his own parallel political ambitions to establish a new British Bill of Rights and break the link between the European Court of Human Rights and courts in the United Kingdom (or at least England), 29 to renegotiate the United Kingdom's relationship with the European Union, and desire to see the successor framework for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reflect the "golden thread of liberty" symbolized by Magna Carta. 30 18 However, the year 2015 also marked another significant but almost unnoticed anniversary: the four hundredth anniversary of the first use of the term 'political economy' in a book published in England. Given that the 2008 crisis was undoubtedly a crisis of global and national political economy (although the relative significance of the crisis for particular political economies is the subject of fierce debate) this anniversary has taken on a particular importance. During 2015, it was a French political economist, Thomas Piketty, who highlighted the importance of the detrimental impact on the distribution of wealth of an economy where r>g, that is where r, i.e. the average annual rate of return on capital is greater than g, the rate of growth of the economy, i.e. the annual increase in income or output. 31 However, in 1615 it was another Frenchman, Antoine de Montchrestien, whose Treatise on Political Economy, first used the term 'political economy' in the title of an economic tract, 32 to show how markets were "only the economic elements of politics". 33 19 At the time of Montchrestien's fashioning of the term 'political economy', England provided the blueprint for emulation by rival national economies. However, it was to be emulated not because of its developmental market qualities of limited government, free trade or entrepreneurship, but because "England was among the most interventionist states of its age, and the harrowing success of these policies made England's economy and the ideas on which it was based worthy of guarded emulation". 34 Sophus Reinert has shown how John Cary's 1695 Essay on The State of England provided a blueprint for state-led industrial modernization, including a fourteen point agenda for nurturing manufacturing industry, more than a century before Alexander Hamilton's reports on the state of manufactures, and more than one hundred and forty years before the publication of Friedrich List's Natural System of Political Economy (1837) and National System of Political Economy (1841). All of these works identified the political economy of England as the blueprint for national development. It was England's status as the world's first developmental state, rather than the limited government of the Whig, neo-liberal interpretation of English history, which attracted emulation by rival national economies. From an inertial bureaucratic 'leviathan' to the very catalyst for new business investment; from market 'fixer' to market shaper and creator; from simply 'derisking' the private sector, to welcoming and taking on risk due to the opportunities it presents for future growth. 45 Both party and politics must move rightwards towards the common ground of an entrepreneur-led, property-owning market order. 29 Hayek's previous optimism that liberalism could triumph over the arbitrary interventions of social democratic, state-led modernization projects had been dissipated during the 1970s by the rise of trades union militancy, and the onset of rising inflation and unemployment. The relative decline of the United Kingdom appeared to confirm that 46 Since personal freedom would no longer be guaranteed by the free constitution of spontaneous market association, a model constitution would have to be drawn up politically and legislation passed to define the limits of state power. In short, the basic principles of a free society might have to be "temporarily suspended when the long-run preservation of that order is itself threatened". 47 To preserve the market order, state power would have to be used to rule out specific policies, for example, rendering "all socialist measures for redistribution impossible".
48
The free economy would have to be accompanied by the strong state. 49 30 The United Kingdom government's reaction to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 must be understood as just the latest phase of the passage of laws and legislation by a strong state to create a model constitution and market order focused upon the United Kingdom's financial and commercial interests. Hayek's thesis had been that the "last battle against arbitrary power", namely "the fight against socialism and for the abolition of all coercive power" could yet be won. 50 Through policies of privatization, market liberalization and deregulation, Thatcherism and Reaganomics subsequently claimed to be rolling back the frontiers of the state to maximize the opportunities for entrepreneurship, competition and profit. However, in practice the developmental market agenda has redefined, not rolled back, the frontiers of state power. Indeed, for more than three decades, Hayek's 'coercive power' has been mobilized by the neo-liberal state to advance the frontiers of the developmental market. Austerity under the Cameron-Clegg and Cameron governments has simply been the latest stage of that political construction. 31 The state has simply defended the interests and promoted the same sectors of the economy-financial services and military industries-which it has always done ever since England's financial, political, scientific, administrative revolutions during the seventeenth century English Enlightenment. This is how a £1.162 trillion state bailout of irresponsible bankers can be reconciled with the Cameron-Clegg government's central political narrative from May 2010 of the need for austerity in fiscal policy, and a wholesale redefinition of the role of the state in the United Kingdom. st -century economy", and required "an urgent rethink". 52 However, the point is that Osborne's developmental market agenda does not owe its basis to economics. Like its predecessor plans, at least since May 1979, and including the Cameron-Clegg government's response to the 2008 crisis, Osborne's plans owe their basis to politics, political economy, history, ideology, and party political advantage rather than economics per se. 33 As this article has suggested, the United Kingdom government's response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis has been based upon a particular developmental market There is little prospect of "an urgent rethink". Indeed, the Cameron government is committed to delivering a budget surplus by 2019-2020 and implementing the world's largest privatization programme to achieve that surplus. Such policies will not come about through a passive state. On the contrary, they will necessitate further programmes of law and legislation, as the British developmental state continues to build its model constitution for a market order focused upon the global financial and commercial interests of the City of London. 35 Despite the mounting evidence of its manifest economic shortcomings, far from being abandoned, the political narrative of the developmental market appears to be on the point of entering a new era. In his 2015 annual speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, paid tribute to the City of London's 350 year history of "pre-eminence through market innovation" as the world economy's "centre of financial capitalism", but also noted that "Though markets can be powerful drivers of prosperity, markets can go wrong left unattended, they are prone to instability, excess and abuse". 53 Carney's solution was to suggest that, since markets "need to retain the consent of society -a social licence -to be allowed to operate, innovate and grow", the need now is for what he has termed "real markets". 36 The qualities that Carney has attributed to those "real markets" have offered a vision of the next incarnation of the developmental market. Carney's "real markets" do not collapse, are transparent, accountable, professional and open, "resilient, fair and effective". 54 However, Carney has conceded that "Real markets don't just happen; they depend on the quality of market infrastructure". 55 While Carney has further suggested that "Removing public subsidies is absolutely necessary for real markets to exist", 56 the actions of the British state in responding to the crisis of 2008 have demonstrated that, when required to do so, the developmental state in the United Kingdom, led by its pilot agency, Her Majesty's Treasury, is prepared to intervene massively and to mobilise hundreds of billions, if not trillions of pounds, to defend the interests of the City of London. If the cost of that intervention and set of priorities is prolonged austerity for millions of ordinary citizens and those on low incomes or disabled, then so be it. 
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